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DLD-341        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1844 
___________ 
 
KEITH ANDERSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LOUIS FOLINO, SUPERINTENDENT; VICTOR SANTOYA; BOGDEN; NELSON; 
STUMP; RUSH; DUKE; BOWMAN; RICK SHAFFER; RAUENSWINDER;  
KERFELT; WILSON; DONNA DOE; ROXANNE DOE; MEGA; TANNER;  
MICHELE HOWARD-DIGGS; WALTERS; GRIM; JOHN MCNANY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00937) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 18, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: July 30, 2013) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Keith Anderson appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motions for 
summary judgment.  For the reasons below, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties and the District Court thoroughly set 
forth the factual and procedural background in its opinion, we will limit our discussion to 
the facts that are helpful to our analysis.  Anderson, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 
civil rights complaint.  After Appellees’ motions to dismiss were granted in part, 
Anderson filed an amended complaint and then a second amended complaint.  After 
discovery, Appellees filed motions for summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the motions be granted.  The District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation as its opinion and granted the motions.  Anderson then filed his 
objections to the Report and Recommendation and a motion to amend or alter the 
judgment.  The District Court reviewed the belated objections and denied the motion to 
amend or alter the judgment.  Anderson filed a notice of appeal.  Appellee Howard-Diggs 
has filed a motion for summary affirmance. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment de novo and review the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that 
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“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 In his response to the summary judgment motions, Anderson did not discuss the 
merits of any of his claims.  He simply argued that the Appellees’ motions addressed the 
first amended complaint instead of the second amended complaint.  He did not specify 
any claims which had not been addressed or contest any of the Appellees’ evidence.  He 
did not respond to or dispute the Appellees’ Concise Statements of Material Facts. 
 Despite Anderson’s limited response, the Magistrate Judge thoroughly described 
and addressed his claims in her Report and Recommendation.  She noted that she would 
not address any claims which had been dismissed with prejudice in the earlier order.  In 
his objections to the Report and Recommendation, Anderson repeated the same 
arguments he made in opposition to the summary judgment motions.  He also challenged 
the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his lack of response to the concise statements 
should be considered an admission of the facts therein.  He again did not discuss the 
merits of his claims or dispute any specific factual statements by the Appellees.  The 
District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and granted summary judgment 
to Appellees. 
 On appeal, Anderson repeats his argument that the Appellees addressed the wrong 
complaint.  He admits that he failed to respond to Appellees’ Concise Statements of 
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Material Facts.  He has not pointed to any mistake made by the District Court in 
evaluating his claims or disputed any of the facts in the Appellees’ Concise Statements.  
 A review of the procedural history of Anderson’s claims indicates that his claims 
have been appropriately addressed.  In his original complaint, Anderson brought claims 
against twenty defendants.  The District Court dismissed several claims with prejudice.  
However, it dismissed Anderson’s claims of denial of medical care, failure to intervene, 
and conspiracy without prejudice to his filing an amended complaint.  It denied the 
motion to dismiss with respect to Anderson’s claims of failure to intervene and 
conspiracy against Rauswinder and his state law tort claims.  Appellees had not moved to 
dismiss Anderson’s claims of excessive force and retaliation against Shaffer. 
 In his first amended complaint, Anderson raised two claims—excessive force and 
failure to intervene—against three defendants, Folino, Shaffer, and Rauswinder.  After 
Appellees filed motions to dismiss, Anderson was given the opportunity to file a second 
amended complaint.  When Anderson asked for clarification, the Magistrate Judge noted 
that if Anderson included any new claims or claims previously dismissed, they would be 
struck from the complaint. 
 In his second amended complaint, he brought claims against twenty defendants 
including violations of his First Amendment right to petition the government, excessive 
force, denial of medical care, and denial of Equal Protection.  Appellees again filed 
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motions to dismiss.  The Magistrate Judge dismissed the motions to dismiss without 
prejudice to Appellees filing motions for summary judgment. 
 The claims remaining at the time of Appellees’ motions for summary judgment 
were those claims that had survived the initial motions to dismiss (excessive force and 
retaliation against Shaffer, failure to intervene and conspiracy against Rauswinder and the 
state law tort claims) and those claims Anderson was permitted to amend (denial of 
medical care, failure to intervene, and conspiracy).  While the Correctional Appellees 
may have mistakenly referred to the first amended complaint in their motion for summary 
judgment, they addressed Anderson’s claims of denial of medical care, excessive force, 
conspiracy, and failure to intervene, and argued that Anderson had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies with respect to several claims.  They noted that Anderson denied 
bringing any state law tort claims.  In the District Court and on appeal, Anderson has not 
pointed to any claim that was not addressed by Appellees or the District Court.  The 
failure to raise an issue in the District Court results in its waiver on appeal. Webb v. City 
of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the 
appeal.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4.  For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by 
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See Third Circuit 
I.O.P. 10.6.  Appellee Howard-Diggs’s motion for summary affirmance is granted. 
